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Abstract 
The study examines the effect of ownership structure on 
financial performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria. 
Data was collected from the annual reports of 28 
insurance firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for 
the periods of 2011 to 2016. The ex-post facto was 
employed by the study to examine the effect of 
ownership structure on financial performance of listed 
insurance firms in Nigeria. In addition to the descriptive 
statistics and correlation, multiple regression technique 
through panel data methodology was applied for model 
estimation. Data were subjected to pooled General Least 
Square, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects regression 
model to test the hypotheses of the study. Ownership 
structure proxied by managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and ownership concentration were adopted 
as independent variables. Firm financial performance as 
the dependent variables was proxied by Book value per 
Share. This study found ownership structure having 
significant positive effect on financial performance of the 
listed insurance firms except concentrated ownership 
with negative effect. However, in respect of size and 
growth of the firms, which form the control variables of 
the study, there were mixed evidence of their effects on 
financial performance. The study recommends that in 
order to enhance the financial performance, insurance 
firms in Nigeria should increase management equity-
holding in the firms as this can stimulate the managers to 
maximize their efficiency and create more wealth for 
stakeholders. 
 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/3 (2018) 123-148 
124 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial performance of many organizations has been largely linked to their 
ownership structure over time as it provides funding through owner’s equity. Normally, 
every business organization is saddled with the responsibility of making returns. This 
responsibility is important since the ability of a firm to make returns in the competitive 
market determines to a large extend its ability to survive in the future. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) defined financial performance as a tool that measures how well a company uses its 
resources in generating profit thus make it a vital tool to several stakeholders in a 
company. Financial performance therefore is crucial to any business organization’s survival 
and continuous patronage by investors, potential investors, creditors, and other 
stakeholders in the business world.  
However, the type of ownership structure a firm adopts is engineered by the vision of the 
company. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership structure is defined by the 
distribution of equity with regards to votes and capital as well as the identity of the equity 
owners. Therefore, ownership structure of any company has been a serious factor for 
company’s financial performance. The effect of managerial, institutional, and concentrated 
ownership on firm’s financial performance measured by Book value per Share has been 
issue the researcher in the existing literature with mixed results. This has been widely 
tackled in the developed climes and more recently in emerging economies, but was less 
discussed in Nigeria context. 
On top of the conflicting viewpoint, there has been very little interest on the ownership 
structure on financial performance of the insurance firms in Nigerian. The few studies in 
this area in Nigeria are those of Ibrahim (2012) and Benjamin, Love and Dandago (2014) 
that focused on the effect of managerial and institutional shareholding components of 
ownership structure on financial performance of the listed insurance firms between the 
periods 2001-2010. This study, however fill gap in literature by not only adding 
concentrated ownership on financial performance measured by Book value per Share of 
the listed insurance firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange but also extend the work to cover 
most recent years of 2011-2016. This study therefore examines the effect of ownership 
structure on financial performance of the listed insurance firms in Nigeria from the period 
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of 2011 to 2016. In order to achieve this objective, the following stated null hypothesis is 
formulated and tested: 
Ho1: Managerial ownership has no positive effect on the financial performance of the listed 
insurance firms in Nigeria. 
Ho2: Institutional ownership has no positive effect on the financial performance of the 
listed insurance firms in Nigeria. 
Ho3: Ownership concentration has no positive effect on the financial performance of the 
listed insurance firms in Nigeria. 
Section 2 of this study reviews previous empirical literature on the effect of ownership 
structure on financial performance, the third section deals with the methodology that was 
adopted for the study. Section 4 presents the analysis of results, while the fifth section 
covers the conclusion and recommendations made by the researchers.  
2.  Literature Review 
Concept of Ownership Structure 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership structure is described by the 
distribution of equity with respect to votes, capital, and also by the equity owners’ identity. 
This was referenced in their study on how the nature of agency costs relates with equity 
where they aimed at incorporating concepts into the beginnings of a theory of corporate 
ownership structure. In the recent years, there have been renewed interests on ownership 
structures due to the increased dynamics of corporate ownership portfolios. Ownership 
structure, as a mechanism in corporate governance to facilitate increased efficiency of a 
firm, has been believed to have affected firm performance. For example, Adam Smith 
(1776) points out that the joint-stock companies are less efficient than private co-partner 
companies because the directors would not watch over other people’s money‟ with the 
same anxious vigilance” as their own. Transaction cost theory considers a firm as an offer 
of contracts where the activities are cheaper internal than external. However, inside of the 
firm, there are conflicts between different parties. The principal-agent theory mentions the 
conflict between shareholders and management. The conflict is led by the different agendas 
of shareholders and managers, more specifically, the divergence between the control right 
and cash flow right. Therefore, ownership structure in this study includes managerial, 
institutional, and concentrated ownership. 
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i. Managerial Ownership  
Managerial ownership refers to an ownership fraction or stake in a firm that is held by 
managers. Managerial ownership is not only meant to increase the equity of the 
organization but also to serve as incentives to managers to align managers’ interests with 
those of the interests of the organization. Managerial ownership is measured by natural 
logarithm of equity held by managers as shareholders in a firm. 
ii. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership refers to an ownership fraction or stake in a firm that is held by 
large financial organizations, pension funds or endowments. Institutions generally 
purchase large blocks of a firm’s outstanding shares and can exert considerable influence 
upon its management. Therefore, institutional shareholders are usually professionals and 
they normally use their expertise in monitoring the management in ensuring that their 
interests align with those of the organization’s interests. Institutional ownership is 
measured by natural logarithm of equity held by various institutions as investors in the 
firm. 
iii. Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration refers to an ownership fraction or stake in a firm that is held by 
shareholders with the controlling interest or with large stake. Ownership concentration 
affords the shareholders the motivation and ability to monitor and control management 
decisions. Therefore, concentrated shareholders use their large stake in reducing conflicts 
between managers and the organization by being more proactive in monitoring and 
protecting their investments. Ownership concentration is measured by natural logarithm of 
equity held by block holders as investors in the firm. 
Concept of Financial Performance 
Financial performance measures how well a firm uses its resources to make a profit and it 
is a vital tool to several stakeholders in a firm. These stakeholders include trade creditors, 
bond holders, investors, employees, and management. Each group has its own interest in 
tracking the financial performance of a firm. Analysts learn about financial performance 
from published annual reports. The report is a required legal document that must be 
published by all public firms. The purpose of the report is to provide stakeholders with 
accurate and reliable financial statements that provide an overview of the firm’s financial 
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performance. Financial performance can be measured in several ways. Some of them are 
Book Value per Share, Earnings per Share, Return on Assets, Dividend per Share, Return on 
Equity, etc. Therefore, financial performance in this study is measured in term of Book 
Value per Share. The justification for chosen Book Value per Share as measure of financial 
performance by this study is because effect of ownership structure has been tested on 
several other financial indicators as mentioned earlier on insurance firms in Nigeria with 
the exception of BPS. 
Book Value per Share (BPS)  
BPS is the shareholders’ fund divide by the ordinary shares in issue and is expressed in 
naira or kobo. It indicates how much shareholder’s fund attributable to every share of the 
firm. Shareholders’ fund is a function of how effective and efficient money invested in the 
firm by shareholders are utilized. It helps in evaluating management commitment to 
wealth creation for shareholders. BPS is a combination of share capital, share premium, 
retained earnings, general reserve, and deposit for share. 
Empirical Literature 
The effect of ownership structure on financial performance has been widely researched 
and it produced very interesting debate in financial literature. The study focuses on some 
of the empirical studies conducted both locally and internationally on the effects of 
ownership structure on financial performance. Mwathi (2009) studied on the effects of 
commercial banks’ financial performance and their ownership structure. She categorized 
them as private banks, government banks, foreign banks, and domestic banks. Using 
regression analysis, the study was centered on banks where the top 10 shareholders hold 
more than 50% of the shares for the period between 2004 and 2008 in Kenya. Using ROA 
as the financial performance measure, the study revealed that bank ownership structure 
had an insignificant positive influence on financial performance. The findings also showed 
that both private and state owned banks had a negative correlation with performance. She 
underscored that both banks that are foreign owned and those owned domestically had a 
positive correlation with performance. The study hypothesized that commercial banks 
owned by states perform dismally than the foreign or domestic commercial banks. The 
study concluded that widely held banks perform well than closely held ones. 
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Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provided evidence of the endogeneity of large US firm’s 
ownership structure using a linear regression of an accounting measure of profit. In that 
model, the accounting measure of profit rate was assumed as a fraction of shares owned by 
the five largest shareholding interests and on a set of control variables in which ownership 
structure is treated as an endogenous variable. Their empirical study found no evidence of 
the relationship between profit rate and ownership concentration. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988) ignored the endogeneity issue altogether and re-examined the relation 
between corporate ownership structure and performance using Tobin’s Q and accounting 
profit rate as alternative measures of performance. They found no significant relation in 
the linear regressions they estimated.  
Demsetz and Villanonga (2001) in a research titled "ownership structure and firm 
performance," examined the effect of ownership structure of shareholders and firm 
performance in a sample including 233 companies in the United States. Demsetz and 
Villanonga hypothesized that the ownership is considered as multidimensional and as an 
endogenous variable, found no meaningful statistical relation between the ownership 
structure and performance of the firm. As it is said by these researchers, the results of this 
research conformed to this point of view that, while the unfocused ownership may lead to 
aggravate the agency problem but it has benefits which may solve too much problems 
(Demsetz & Villanonga, 2001). Lemmon and Lins (2003) used a sample of 800 firms in 
eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the 
region’s financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firm’s investment opportunities, 
raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. The 
evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in 
determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.  
Additionally, using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, Lauterbach and Tolkowsky (2004) found 
that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong 
when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered 
endogenous. Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2005) addressed the question whether there is 
any empirical relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Using a 
data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003, they found evidence for a positive and 
significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price 
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performance as well as by Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. Mueller and Spitz (2006) 
analyzed the relationship between managerial ownership and performance of German 
SMEs with motivational hypothesis testing in their research. They used a sample of 356 
firms in services sector that are associated with business in their research, for the years 
1997 to 2000. The findings showed that performance of companies with managerial 
ownership percentage, above 40 percent, is being improved (Mueller & Spitz, 2006).  
Karamu (2008) in the research entitled "Relationship between institutional owners and 
informational content of profit" collected evidences in connection with the supervisory role 
of institutional investors from the perspective that whether institutional ownership as 
effect on the informational content of reported profit. In this research, the different 
attitudes (the active monitoring hypothesis and the self-interest hypothesis) were 
examined about institutional investors. To test the relationship between informational 
content of corporate profit and institutional ownership, two models of multiple linear 
regressions were used. Based on the results of this research, the number of institutional 
ownership does not increase informational content of profit and may also degrade it, while 
the level of institutional ownership does not reduce the informational content of profit, but 
it is also possible to increase it (Karamu, 2008).  
Numazu and Karamu (2008) analyzed the "impact of ownership structure on corporate 
performance of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)". The main hypothesis of 
this research emphasized the existence of a significant relationship between ownership 
structure and performance. Research sample included 66 companies during 1382 and 
1386. Statistical method used to test hypotheses in this research was "panel data". In this 
research, the ownership structure is divided into two institutional and private ownership 
categories that the private ownership also is divided into three categories including 
corporate, management, and external shareholders. The findings of this research indicated 
that there is a negative and meaningful relation between institutional ownership and firm 
performance and a positive and meaningful relation between the corporate ownership and 
firm performance. Managerial ownership has a negative meaningful influence on the 
performance and in the case of private ownership, no information indicating the ownership 
of external investors was observed in the sample companies. In the private ownership, it is 
also better that the main part of ownership is held by corporate investors. In general, there 
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is a meaningful relation between the ownership structure and performance of the 
companies (Namazu & Karamu, 2008).  
Alireza, Ali, and Kazem (2011) examined the effect of ownership structure on firm 
performance of listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange between the period of 2001 and 
2006. Using regression analysis, the study found that ownership concentration doesn’t 
have any significant effect on firm performance but the effects of two other variables are 
significant: institutional ownership has positive and significant effect on firm performance 
whereas concentrated institutional ownership is negative. Abosede and Kajola (2011) 
investigated the relationship between firms’ ownership structure and financial 
performance of listed companies in Nigeria between 2001 and 2008 respectively. 
Employing pooled OLS as a method of estimation and after controlling for four firm-specific 
characteristics, they found negative and significant relationship between ownership 
structure (director shareholding) and firm financial performance measured by ROE. 
Ibrahim (2012) examined the effects of ownership structure on the financial performance 
of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange with the first finding showing a 
significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and firm financial 
performance measured in term of ROA and BPS and of course the second finding showed a 
significant positive effect between insider ownership and firm performance with firm 
growth as control variable having negative effect. Davis (2014) evaluated the effects of 
ownership structure on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya for the 
period 2009 and 2013. Using regression analysis, the study found that ownership structure 
positively affects the financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya.  
Benjamin, Love, and Dandago (2014) examined the impact of ownership structure on the 
financial performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria and they found a positive 
relationship between ownership structure and firm’s performance measured by ROA and 
ROE for the period 2001 and 2010. Anthony (2014) investigated the effect of ownership 
structure on financial performance of listed companies in the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
during the period 2008 to 2013. Employing linear regression analysis, the study found a 
positive effect of ownership concentration on financial performance measured by ROE. 
Also, a positive effect of ownership identity on financial performance was identified. 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/3 (2018) 123-148 
131 
 
Reem, Allam, and Wajeeh (2015) assessed the relationship between ownership structure 
dimensions and corporate performance of 42 out of 48 listed companies in Bahrain for the 
period 2007 and 2011. The first finding showed that ownership concentration has a 
negative relationship on company’s performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. Second 
finding showed that institutional ownership has a positive relationship on company’s 
performance. While the third finding showed that managerial ownership found a 
significance positive relationship with company’s performance.  
Stanley (2015) assessed the impact of ownership structure on financial performance of 
listed Chinese banks between the periods 2005-2013. Using correlation analysis, the 
results revealed that there is no significant difference in performance between the two 
types of ownership structure (state-owned and joint venture).Helen and Bature (2016) 
evaluated the impact of ownership structure on the financial performance of listed 
conglomerate firms in Nigeria from the year 2004 to 2013. Using regression analysis, they 
found a negative impact of both managerial and foreign ownership and financial 
performance measured by Earning per Share (EPS) within the study period, while firm size 
as control variable positively impacted the firms Earnings per Share. 
Abdul (2016) examined the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in India in 
terms of textiles, oil marketing and distribution, and movies and entertainment industries 
registered in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The research was carried out on 50 companies 
listed under BSE covering the period of 2011-2015. Using correlation statistical analysis, 
the study found that ownership structure measured by managerial, concentrate, 
institutional, and foreign shareholding has influence on companies’ financial performance 
measured by ROA. Saseela and Thirunavukkarasu (2017) investigated the relationship 
between ownership structure and financial performance of listed beverage food and 
tobacco companies in Sri Lanka from the period of 2010 to 2015. The study also examined 
the impact of ownership structure on financial performance. Using Pearson’s correlation 
and regression analysis, the results revealed that the ownership concentration and foreign 
ownership structure are positively correlated with the financial performance of the 
companies measured by Return on Equity (ROE). The study also found a significant impact 
of foreign ownership structure on financial performance. 
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Finally, the findings of the foreign studies are very vital only that, differences in political 
and economic conditions among the nations may hardly allow their findings applicable to 
Nigeria. However, the last review on this area was those of Benjamin, Love, and Dandago 
(2014) with a dataset ranges from 2001-2010, whereas this study is considering the review 
from 2011-2016 which earlier identified as gap in chapter one to be filled by this study by 
extending the year of assessment to 2016, a period considered most relatively current. 
Theoretical Review  
The Agency Theory 
The agency theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The theory states the 
relationship between principals such as shareholders, and agents such as a firm’s senior 
managers. The principal delegates work to an agent. The theory attempts to deal with first, 
the agency problem where there is a conflict of interests between a firm's managers and 
firm's stockholders, and second, that the principal and agent settle for different risk 
tolerances. Therefore, there are two main agency relationships in a firm that are normally 
in conflicts; those between the firm’s managers and stockholders and between the 
stockholders and the debt-holders. These agency conflicts have implications on corporate 
governance and business ethics. Such relationships have expensive agency costs that are 
incurred so as to sustain an effective agency relationship. Incentive fees paid to agents to 
encourage behavior consistent with the principal’s goals are common examples of agency 
costs (Bowie & Edward, 1992). 
One of the ways of reducing agency problems is debt financing which helps those problems 
that are normally related to free cash-flow and asymmetric information problems 
especially in the case of privately held debt. Secondly, conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders also arise from the divisions between ownership and control. 
Managerial ownership can align the interests between them and owners, hence; reduce the 
total agency costs. The relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs is 
linear and the optimal point for the firm is achieved when the managers acquire all of the 
shares of the company according to Jensen and Meckling (1976). Thirdly, ownership 
concentration is the other option of reducing agency costs by shareholders proactively 
taking active roles in monitoring. This is however dependent on the amounts of their equity 
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stakes. The more the investor’s stake, the more motivated they are to monitor and protect 
their investment according to Gilson and Lang (1990). 
According to Aggrawal and Knoeber (1996), agents such as company managers will highly 
unlikely venture into behaviors that are strictly profit maximizing where shareholders are 
not strictly monitoring their activities. The implication therefore is that, if owner-
controlled firms are highly performing than manager-controlled firms, the assumption is 
that concentrated ownership of insurance firms provides better monitoring which leads to 
better performance. Among the previous studies that adopted agency theory in explaining 
the effect of ownership structure on financial performance are those of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Benjamin, Love, and Dandago (2014), Helen and Bature (2016). 
3.   Methodology 
The study adopts ex-post factor research design to examine the effect of ownership 
structure on financial performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria. The population of 
this study is the listed insurance firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st December, 
2016. As at the time of this study, there are 28 listed insurance firms in Nigeria. The entire 
population of the study was used based on the condition that the firms have complete data 
in their published annual reports for the periods under study. Multiple regression 
technique is used to analyze the panel data gathered for ownership structure and financial 
performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria by means of STATA 12. A regression shows 
the effects one variable called independent has on the other variable called dependent 
which can either be positive or negative. The GLS regression is run to produce statistics for 
the coefficient of determination and f-test as well as t-test for results interpretation. The 
coefficient of determination (R2) measures the explanatory power of the Independent 
Variables on the Dependent Variables. T-Test measures the individual significance of the 
estimated Independent Variables, while F-Test measures the overall significance. 
Hausman’s test is used to decide between the fixed effect and random effect estimates of 
the coefficients when there is present of heteroscedasticity in the results.  Diagnostics test 
conducts by the study includes variance inflation factor (VIF) to test for multicolinearity 
which could mislead the results of the study. Hettest to test the error variances among 
variables so as the disturbances that could be appearing in the sampled firms are 
homoscedastics. The multiple regression model employed to determine the effect of 
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ownership structure on the financial performance of listed insurance firms in Nigeria is as 
shown below:- 
BPSit = α0 + β1MGROWNit + β2INSTOWNit + β3OWNCONCit + β4SIZEit + β5GROWTHit + μit  
MGROWN = Managerial Ownership, measured by natural log of equity held by managers. 
INSTOWN = Institutional Ownership, measured by natural log of equity held by 
institutions. 
OWNCONC = Ownership Concentration, measured by natural log of equity held by 
individuals with block vote. 
SIZE = Firm Size, measured by natural log of total assets. 
GROWTH = Firm Growth, measured by natural log of increase in total assets. 
BPS = Book Value per Share, measured by shareholder’s fund divided by ordinary shares. 
α0= Constant or Intercept; 
β1 – β3= Coefficient of the explanatory Variables; 
β4 – β5= Coefficient of control variables; 
μit = error term of firm i for time period t;  
it = firm i for time period t. 
A priori expectations are β1, β2, β3, β4, …………… β5. 
Theoretically, there are expectations of MGROWN, INSTOWN, OWNCONC, SIZE, and 
GROWTH, having no positive effect on BPS respectively.  
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables. The MGROWN, 
INSTOWN, and OWNCONC which are the proxies of ownership structure, range between 
minimum of 5.8982, 8.6358, 8.2842 and maximum of 9.3046, 9.7169, 9.5308 within the 
timeframe. 
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Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables             Observations         Means                Std. Dev.          Minimum           Maximum 
 
BPS                                168             0.8157                  0.6357               1.6439                 3.547 
MGROWN                     168             8.3085                 0.6765               5.8982               9.3046 
INSTOWN                     168             9.2384                 0.2635               8.6358               9.7169 
OWNCONC                  168             9.0744                 0.2632                8.2842               9.5308 
SIZE                               168           10.0015                 0.3413                 8.807              10.8997 
GROWTH                      168             5.5684                 6.9067               9.7382               10.333 
 
Source: Descriptive Statistic Results Using STATA 12 
 
From the Table above, the mean BPS of the firms over the year amounted to about N82 
with minimum value of N164 and maximum value of N355 respectively. The standard 
deviation of about N64 shows the wide disparity in terms of ownership of the firms over 
the years. The table shows that the firms have a mean SIZE of about N1000 over the years 
under investigation. This shows that firms have enough assets to generate profit for the 
firms and owners of equity. The standard deviation of 34% indicates that there is 
considerable variation in the financial performance of the firms during the period under 
investigation. While some firms performed well and consistently reported good results, 
others performed poorly as they reported losses for some years. Also, the table shows that 
firms enjoy a mean GROWTH of about 6% over the period under study with a standard 
deviation of 7% showing the variation in the financial performance.  
Table 2 shows the correlation between the dependent and independent variables. As 
evidenced from the table, the correlation coefficients are averagely good with highest 
0.5232, which is the correlation between firm size and financial performance. 
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Table 2:  Summary of Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
 
               BPS      MGROWN   INSTOWN   OWNCONC     SIZE       GROWTH         
 
BPS                       1.0000         
MGROWN               0.0512              1.0000       
INSTOWN               0.0900              0.2037         1.0000   
OWNCONC             0.0779              0.4119          0.6372           1.0000   
SIZE                       0.5232              0.4267          0.4072           0.5381          1.0000  
GROWTH                0.3802              0.1815         0.3047           0.2762          0.4401       1.0000 
 
Source: Correlation Matrix Results Using STATA 12 
 
Table 2 displays the correlation values between dependent and independent variables and 
also the relationship within the independent variables themselves. The values were gotten 
from the Pearson correlation.  
The Table shows that there are positive relationships between the dependent variables 
measured by Book value per Share (BPS) and the independent variables measured by 
managerial ownership (MGROWN), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), and Ownership 
Concentration (OWNCONC). Positive relationships also occur within the independent 
variables themselves. Positive relationships equally found between the control variables 
and other variables of the study.  
The Table 3 below presents the regression results. The coefficients of the independent 
variables (MGROWN, INSTOWN, OWNCONC, SIZE, GROWTH) which explain the power of 
ownership structure on financial performance alongside the probability values are 
provided in the table. The table also provides the analysis on the relationships between the 
dependent and the independent variables. The relationships within the variables 
themselves were also shown on the table as well as the overall relationship. 
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Table 3: Summary of Regression Results 
Variables     Coefficients   
       
     Standard        
       Error 
         t-test     Significant   
       values 
Constant -5.1688 2.5269 -2.05 0.043 
MGROWN  0.0324 0.1512  0.21 0.831 
INSTOWN  1.7281 0.6775  2.55 0.012 
OWNCONC -1.3391 0.6216 -2.15 0.033 
SIZE  0.1870 0.1896  0.99 0.326 
GROWTH  0.0058 0.0044  1.31 0.191 
R-Squared 0.3843 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3653 
Durbin Watson 1.65 
F-Statistic 0.0000 
Source: Output of data analysis by author using STATA 12  
 
The cumulative R2 Overall (0.3843) which is the multiple coefficient of determination gives 
the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables jointly. Hence, it signifies that 38% of the total variation in Book 
value per Share of listed insurance firms in Nigeria was caused by their managerial, 
institutional, and concentrated ownership respectively. Also, the regression results 
provided that Adjusted R2 is 0.3653 (see appendix I). This means that ownership structure 
of the listed insurance firms contributes about 37% to firm’s financial performance 
measured by BPS of the organization. This finding provides valid support of the contention 
that ownership structure can bring about a competitive advantage for a firm.  
Discussion of Regression Results 
Managerial Ownership and Financial Performance: The regression results revealed that 
the managerial ownership as depicted in Table 3 has a coefficient value of 0.0324 with a p-
value of 0.831 which is insignificant at 5%. This indicates that managerial ownership 
though positive but insignificantly affected the Book value per Share of the listed insurance 
firms in Nigeria. This implies that for every one naira proportionate increase in managerial 
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ownership of the firms, the BPS of the listed insurance firms in Nigeria will increase by 0.03 
naira. This finding is in line with the studies of Benjamin, Love, and Dandago (2014). 
Institutional Ownership and Financial Performance: The institutional ownership as 
depicted in table 3 above has a beta value of 1.7281 with a p-value of 0.012 which is 
significant at 5% significant level. This indicates that institutional ownership has positively 
and significantly affected the BPS of the listed insurance firms in Nigeria. This implies that 
for every one naira proportionate increase in institutional ownership of the firms under 
investigation, the BPS will increase by 1.73 naira. This finding is however in line with those 
of Reem, Allam, and Wajeeh (2015) and Numazu and Karamu (2008). 
Ownership Concentration and Financial Performance: The concentrated ownership as 
depicted in table 3 above has a coefficient value of -1.3391 with a p-value of 0.033 which is 
significant at 0.05 level of significant. This indicates that institutional ownership is 
negatively and significantly affected the BPS of the listed insurance firms in Nigeria. This 
implies that for every one naira proportionate increase in ownership concentration of the 
firms under investigation, the BPS will decrease by 1.34 naira. This finding is however in 
line with those of Reem, Allam, and Wajeeh (2015) and Numazu and Karamu (2008). 
The Hausman test: In ensuring greater results credibility and reliability, Hausman test was 
conducted by the researcher to decide between fixed effect and random effect. The results 
obtained from the Hausman test conducted indicate that fixed effect was decided against 
random effect (See Appendix I for the results). 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Based on the empirical analysis, the researchers conclude that both managerial and 
institutional shareholding should be prioritized against block-holding (concentrated 
ownership) by insurance firms in Nigeria as this can increase the financial performance of 
the firms under investigation. This confirms to economic criterion, and could be supported 
by the work of Ibrahim (2012); he opined that an increase in managerial and institutional 
ownership could lead to an increase in the financial performance of an organization due to 
positive effects shown by his empirical analysis. It is therefore concluded that, 
organization's financial performance is dependent upon its managerial and institutional 
ownership structures as high managerial shareholding can stimulate management of an 
organization towards increased efficiency. Therefore, ownership by managers may be seen 
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as a system of aligning the interests of managers with those of the shareholders in a way 
that enhances corporate performance.  
However, this form of managerial ownership can also lead to entrenchment of managers, 
which is costly when they chose to pursue their self interests against the interest of the 
organization. It has been argued that the overall effect of managerial ownership on firm 
performance depends on how well the entrenchment effect and incentive alignment are 
balanced (Cubbin & Leech, 1982; Hansmann, 1988, 1996; Hill & Jones, 1982; Nickel, 1997). 
The findings therefore, suggest that when managers also double up as shareholders, they 
are motivated to work towards realization of the wealth creation objective of the 
shareholders of whom they are part. On the other hand, managers who are not 
shareholders are more likely to engage in insider dealings as a way of enhancing their 
personal wealth and prestige. The institutional ownership which has also been identified in 
the study to have shown positive effect on firms’ financial performance was as a result of 
the fact that institutional investors are more sophisticated than other shareholders because 
they are more professional regarding capital markets, industries, and businesses and they 
are better informed. Apart from that, institutional shareholders have higher capabilities in 
taking actions and can therefore monitor managers more effectively and less costly (Hand, 
1990). 
From the conclusion drawn, it is imperative to recommend that:  
1) there is dire need to reasonably increase managers’ shareholding of the listed insurance 
firms in Nigeria as not only meant to increase the equity of the firms but as a way of 
motivating them towards increasing their operational efficiency. At the same time, the 
managers should be protected by the Board of Directors from unnecessary direct 
interference by other shareholders.  
2) the institutional ownership is one of the identified ownership structures that has proven 
empirically positive to firm’s financial performance in this study. This was linked by the 
researcher to the fact that institutional owners frequently deploy their professionalism and 
wealth of experience to the firms towards meeting corporate goals. Therefore, the 
institution ownership should be increased against concentrated ownership for better 
performance. 
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      growth         168    5.568394    6.906723    -9.7382     10.333
                                                                      
        size         168    10.00152    .3412885      8.807    10.8997
     ownconc         168    9.074395    .2632442     8.2842     9.5308
     instown         168     9.23841     .263507     8.6358     9.7169
      mgrown         168    8.308446    .6764584     5.8982     9.3046
         bps         168    .8156643    .6356879    -1.6439      3.547
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth
      growth      168      0.0000         0.2355        31.95         0.0000
        size      168      0.0024         0.0013        16.06         0.0003
     ownconc      168      0.0219         0.1218         7.13         0.0283
     instown      168      0.8541         0.3174         1.05         0.5926
      mgrown      168      0.0000         0.0000        45.80         0.0000
         bps      168      0.3131         0.0000        17.63         0.0001
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality
. sktest bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth
      growth     0.3802   0.1815   0.3047   0.2762   0.4401   1.0000
        size     0.5232   0.4267   0.4072   0.5381   1.0000
     ownconc     0.0779   0.4119   0.6372   1.0000
     instown     0.0900   0.2037   1.0000
      mgrown     0.0512   1.0000
         bps     1.0000
                                                                    
                    bps   mgrown  instown  ownconc     size   growth
(obs=168)
. correlate bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth
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       _cons    -3.838051   1.714185    -2.24   0.027    -7.223078   -.4530237
      growth     .0188744   .0063991     2.95   0.004      .006238    .0315109
        size       1.2002   .1514503     7.92   0.000     .9011286    1.499271
     ownconc    -.5346214   .2180699    -2.45   0.015    -.9652476   -.1039953
     instown    -.1489436   .1973717    -0.75   0.452    -.5386967    .2408095
      mgrown    -.1477818   .0664148    -2.23   0.027    -.2789322   -.0166315
                                                                              
         bps        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    67.4845449   167  .404099071           Root MSE      =  .50646
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3653
    Residual      41.55298   162  .256499877           R-squared     =  0.3843
       Model    25.9315649     5  5.18631298           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   162) =   20.22
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     168
. regress bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth
    Mean VIF        1.65
                                    
      growth        1.27    0.786296
      mgrown        1.31    0.760955
        size        1.74    0.574893
     instown        1.76    0.567827
     ownconc        2.15    0.466081
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0033
         chi2(1)      =     8.64
         Variables: fitted values of bps
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                delta:  1 unit
        time variable:  year, 2011 to 2016
       panel variable:  firms (strongly balanced)
. xtset firm year
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(27, 135) =    14.24             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .83628728   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .28283557
     sigma_u    .63924974
                                                                              
       _cons    -5.168761   2.526878    -2.05   0.043    -10.16615   -.1713731
      growth     .0058136   .0044282     1.31   0.191     -.002944    .0145713
        size     .1869576   .1895645     0.99   0.326    -.1879427    .5618579
     ownconc    -1.339104   .6215905    -2.15   0.033    -2.568418   -.1097888
     instown      1.72805   .6774646     2.55   0.012     .3882332    3.067866
      mgrown     .0324149   .1511756     0.21   0.831    -.2665639    .3313936
                                                                              
         bps        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4165                        Prob > F           =    0.0443
                                                F(5,135)           =      2.35
       overall = 0.0292                                        max =         6
       between = 0.0272                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0800                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: firms                           Number of groups   =        28
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       168
. xtreg bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth, fe
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         rho    .67638039   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .28283557
     sigma_u    .40889529
                                                                              
       _cons     -4.12958   2.092101    -1.97   0.048    -8.230023   -.0291379
      growth     .0065025   .0045031     1.44   0.149    -.0023235    .0153284
        size     .5226529   .1707322     3.06   0.002      .188024    .8572818
     ownconc    -.5188548   .3573183    -1.45   0.146    -1.219186    .1814762
     instown     .4560684   .3565179     1.28   0.201    -.2426938    1.154831
      mgrown     .0212628   .1028113     0.21   0.836    -.1802436    .2227692
                                                                              
         bps        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0033
                                                Wald chi2(5)       =     17.76
       overall = 0.2699                                        max =         6
       between = 0.3336                                        avg =       6.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0442                         Obs per group: min =         6
Group variable: firms                           Number of groups   =        28
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       168
. xtreg bps mgrown instown ownconc size growth, re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0002
                          =       24.17
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      growth      .0058136     .0065025       -.0006888               .
        size      .1869576     .5226529       -.3356954        .0823726
     ownconc     -1.339104    -.5188548       -.8202487         .508624
     instown       1.72805     .4560684        1.271981        .5760671
      mgrown      .0324149     .0212628        .0111521        .1108328
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
